Royalty free shooter Don Farrall argues that return-per-image (RPI) as I have calculated it has weaknesses as a measure of success. Companies offering stock images for sale need to continually provide customers with new material and a greater "depth of choice." But as growth in number of images exceeds growth in revenue, RPI automatically falls. The problem is that older images in the count have less chance of selling and that skews the averages.
In any business one would hope that the rate of increase in supply would match the increase in demand. However, that is impossible to manage in stock photography, particularly when competitors increase their supply and offer a broader base of imagery in an attempt to gain market share. All a falling RPI does is call attention to the fact that supply is exceeding demand.
RPI has little relevance for a distributor but it has relevance for suppliers that pay all production costs. Assuming producers are attempting to turn a profit from their photo businesses, they need some basis for determining what they can afford to spend on production in order to realize a profit, over a reasonable period of time.
Farrall points out that "useful life" is an important consideration in conjunction with RPI and says, "Images become dated, concepts become over used, and some images reach market saturation as the majority of potential buyers for specific images have already purchased the photo. If older images are not thrown out of a collection, then each successive year the collection has a larger percentage of dated, irrelevant and un-saleable images. However, agencies have little incentive to remove already keyworded and uploaded images as they add to the depth of the collection and occasionally sell."
Farrall has found that the vast majority of his income comes from the most recent images produced, despite the fact that he has more than 2,000 images on gettyimages.com produced over a 10- year period. Older images have very little effect on overall revenue.
To determine his sales trends, Farrall only looks at sales from the previous three years production. Sales of older images are considered a bonus. He tracks sales by years and divides gross revenue for images that have been on Getty by the number of years they have been on the site. Then, he divides the resulting sum by the total number of images produced in those three years.
Farrall said, "This is a far more relevant number to me. It tells me what I can expect to earn from new work that I produce. It tells me what I can afford to spend for production. By this method, my RPI has remained surprisingly steady. As I produce new material I am earning the next three years Accounts Receivables.
This strategy should work better for someone with a depth of imagery in a collection and some years of experience, but it doesn't help the novice. It also has weaknesses in that it doesn't account for changes that Getty might make, such as accepting a significant number of competitive images from other suppliers, instituting a tighter editing policy, re-pricing the collection downward, or the impact that the availability of microstock may have on traditional collections in the next three years.
Photographers considering joining Getty and looking for some way to estimate possible earnings may find my figures useful. In addition, contributing photographers can determine if they are doing as well or better than their colleagues. If they are earning more than the average RPI, the only way to grow revenue is probably through greater volume, not better quality images.
Most businesses adjust their production of new product based on demand. There is always hope that demand will grow, so suppliers usually produce a little more than is required by current demand. But, when demand begins to decline, manufacturers cut back on production. Unfortunately, reacting to demand in this way is impossible in the stock photo business, and those hurt the most as the volume of sales declines are the producers who invested in creating new images based on the expectation of growing demand.